

Is the 'war on terror' the opening battle of a 'clash of civilisations'?

"This notion of the 'clash of civilizations' however, must be rejected out of hand: what we are witnessing today are, rather, clashes *within* each civilization."

What Žižek (2002, p.41) tries to oppose in this quote is the notion of an exclusive identity that is underlying the most recent concepts of a 'clash of civilizations' as presented by Huntington in his work on 'The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order'. As Kaldor (2001, p.142) in her treatise about Huntington points out, it is not entirely comprehensible how exactly Huntington defines the term culture and therefore civilization. It appears, however, that he perceives nation-states and political civilizational blocs as the dominant political institutions which derive their legitimacy through cultural identity and govern their security policy by civilizational defence, which can strategically be described as the mode of nation-state warfare.

This observation of the current global situation is problematic in particular points and this essay will attempt to outline an alternative view towards this perception of modern global civil society as it will present why and how the most recent conflicts and their consequences are increasingly inappropriate to be described in the traditional and commonly accepted terms.

In general, the current situation differs in two aspects. First, on a cultural and political level, for it has to be taken into account that the process of globalization is reevaluating the traditional notions of nationality, cultural belonging and religion. The dynamic diversity of the globalisation process and the new means of communication create a scenario of cultural reproduction that differs from the mode of preservation of cultural values which was

inherent from the very beginning of culture, like oral tradition for example. To that respect, the new conflicts we are faced with today are only apparently motivated by issues of cultural identity whereas on a broader scope, they predominantly are evoked by economic and political interests that have their origin in transnational processes like the emergence of new communication technologies and the deregulation policies in terms of global trading. Hence, a nation-state becomes increasingly entwined in economic, political and judicial institutional networks with international ties and references and therefore, the rise of conflicts, may they be institutional, non- or even counter-institutional cannot be reduced to the responsibility of a single entity alone. It is therefore not only necessary to understand the processes of those relationships but it is also important to examine how exactly the cultural legitimacy for waging conflicts is created nowadays by a nation-state as well as by sub-state or particularistic groups.

Secondly, on a strategic level, it seems no longer appropriate to apply traditional military know-how to the new situations. The overall form of new conflicts with which the military branches of western industrialised nation-states are concerned with is repeatedly described as 'asymmetric' as opposed to the symmetric bloc strategy that was characteristic for the Cold War period. Rogers refers to those kind of conflicts as "low-intensity" conflicts or sub-state conflicts (2002, p.92). Also, the usage of weapon technology by the warring parties is moving towards a lighter weapon arsenal which is relatively easy to carry around and to put up by troops and therefore increases mobility. It seems that the US strategy of an 'overwhelming force' is not as effective as some military planners believe it to be. Although there have been major improvements in accuracy and range in terms of rockets and new weapon systems, the US Army is still faced with failures in military operations against

relatively small and mobile targets. Recent examples would be the operations carried out in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia in the 1990s, but also the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rogers also points out that especially the modern and powerful western industrialized nations are prone to sub-state conflicts that are brought about by 'external' groups of interest, be it paramilitary groupings or terrorist organisations (Rogers 2002, p. 112).

"What can be said is that, on recent trends, anti-elite action will be a core feature of the next 30 years, not so much a clash of civilizations, but more a battle of insurgencies." (Rogers, 2002, p. 98)

It is also important to outline the motivations of individuals to take part in an armed struggle led by a resistance or particularistic groups in order to distinguish the dynamics of insurgencies led by so-called sub-state actors as opposed to a battle that is more likely to be perceived as a 'total war' in Clausewitzian terms, in which all efforts of the state are directed to the confrontation with the enemy and the dissolving of the difference between the public and the private sphere in order to ensure the utmost support for the conflict at hand. Those kind of wars were the one that were led by the nation-states on the 20th century in World War II but it becomes more unlikely that this form of strategy might prove to be useful against a network of small groups that operate without any borders and in which a considerable amount of people are engaged in clandestine operations and activities.

Cultural and political analysis

In order to understand how the process of globalization is changing the modern culture, it is necessary to understand its history in terms of the formation of identity. While in the earliest

periods of civilisation this identity-forming activity was predominantly carried out by oral tradition, the techniques changed with the introduction of the written language and were finally fully institutionalized with the invention of the letterpress and, originating from that incident, the uniform distribution and composition of information and knowledge. Those developments helped building a new class of intellectuals that contributed to the forming of cultural identity through scientific publications, fiction and also mass media. The effects were, among other things, the increase and intensification in primary education, which led to a cultural understanding that was organized by political and economic institutions which were organized in a vertical structure. (Kaldor 2001, p.71) The changes the culture was involved in due to this development were leading up to an era of a stratified society in the 18th and 19th century, while the period of industrialization and the growing perception of the interlocking of institutions towards a state apparatus initiated further changes and differentiations within the culture and the society until the end of World War II in the 20th century. In the post-war years, a dramatic increase in communication technologies contributed to a further consolidation and expansion of transnational networks that were already prevalent in the first era of industrialisation and colonialism.

The main difference that the process of globalisation articulates is the 'de-verticalization' of the long-established forms of governance within nation-states, since more and more individuals take part in forms of communication and interaction that go beyond geopolitical borders and have horizontal tendencies of organization instead of vertical ones. Prominent examples may be the increase in the use of the English language due to new communication technologies such as the internet or the global mass consumption of products manufactured by transnational corporations such as Coca-Cola or Disney. (Businessweek 2004, p.68)

Despite all optimism about the formation of a 'global village', it has to be taken into account that those networks produce processes of inclusion as well as exclusion. Whereas the creation of global brands integrates markets of different nation-states into a whole set of business and consumer relations, the weaker or developing nation-states are still left out of the process. Furthermore, there is also a trend to 'localize' certain products by reshaping its ideological value to local needs in order to make particular groups of consumers feel more comfortable with the acceptance of the product due to their cultural backgrounds. Thus, while globalization creates uniformity, it also creates diversity and fragmentation at the same time.

Since the end of World War II and during the period of the Cold War, there have also been developments on a political level to form transnational alliances. During the Cold War, the cultural divide was more polarized between two hegemonic cultures but this also meant an increase in international agreements and transnational institutions such as the NATO, the OSCE, the United Nations and so on. By the end of the Cold War period, there was an increase in fragmentation and individualization among the participants of the pre-established internationally shared forms of governance, which either reevaluated the alliances as, for example, the accelerated establishment of institutions in the EU or led to conflicts of separatist or particularist nature as in former Yugoslavia. Parallel to that, there has been a significant growth in the so-called non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace or Amnesty International which try to administer forms of governance that once were part of the authority of nation-states such as humanitarian or ecological activities, although their impact towards national governments is restricted.

On a social level, the changes due to globalization have been identifiable in terms of an increased need for people with special education and skill, which in turn is linked to a reduction of the traditional working class due to a decrease in the production of products that are manufactured on the basis of a certain territory. It can be observed that highly skilled workers shift their employers with less consideration about location in a geographic sense, but more in terms of particular need of large corporations that operate on an international level. Furthermore, there is increased exchange between individuals of particular nations in terms of tertiary education, as foreign students in universities, for example, and scholars and academics who work on an international level.

But as much as inter- and transnational relations increase, exclusive distinctions are also part of the process. On the level of international organisation of large corporations, there are always regions which are left out of the expansion process due to the fear of unstable market situations and therefore a loss of investment. But even on a national level, there are distinguishable disparities between economically stronger and poorer regions, as the differences between rural and urban areas, for example. Those conditions create a global as well as a regional or local fragmentation between those who are integrated in the global merging of markets and cultures and those who are not but also do not have an alternative way of living in terms of cultural identity and possibilities of earning a livelihood.

“What can, however, be accepted as a given is the historic shift away from vertical cultures characteristic of the era of the nation-state which gave rise to a sense of national identity and a sense of security. The abstract symbols, like money and law, which form the basis of social relations in societies no longer dominated by face-to-face interactions, were a constitutive part of these national cultures. It is now commonplace to talk about a ‘crisis of identity’ – a sense of alienation and disorientation that accompanies the decomposition of cultural communities” (Kaldor 2001, p.75)

It is this sense of alienation that leads to a form of cultural divide among individuals. As well as there are groups of people who consider themselves participants in the formation of the 'global village' and have wide and frequent access to information technologies and modern infrastructure, there are also groups that perceive themselves as not being part of a global transition towards an international society and try to rely upon local or particularistic values in order to refer to their cultural identity. It is not entirely common for those groupings to form a structure of political interest. Although NGO's (non-governmental organizations) tend to collaborate across national boundaries, the overall identification with political ambitions is not likely. The factors that hinder such a development may be situated in the ambiguity of the power relationships a single nation-state and its institutions is embedded in, accompanied by a fragmentation of cultural perception and identification with particularistic interests.

A politicization in reference to cultural identities is more likely to happen in nation-states which experience a sudden change in their structure of governance, be it a loss of legitimacy or the breakout from an international alliance. If those effects are linked to the phenomenon of globalisation and influence the current politics and governance of a nation in a disruptive way, the possibility to experience the exclusion from the global community rises and is taken into account by the population and thus opens up the space for fear and emotional debates. In such situations, a form of political mobilization may take place of which Kaldor refers to as 'identity politics' (2001, p. 76). Identity politics are based on reactionary values of the particular history of the nation and they try to gain legitimacy through a fear of developments that come from outside their particular point of view or of the difference of identity by individuals that are not part of this political grouping. Through a recursive

correlation of exclusion, first, the external exclusion that led to eruptions in the political system, and second, the seemingly self-chosen internal exclusion from domestic politics that try to counterbalance the eruptive event, a state of particularistic inclusion is created through fear and the accompanied crisis of cultural identity that is motivated by particularistic interests. This form of politicization can be utilized in two ways, by either a top-down model as a polemical tactic by politicians already or still in power or as a bottom-up strategy to legitimize illegal businesses in a weak economy situation by criminals and black-market businessmen to accumulate money and influence. Nation-states that have a centralised or even authoritarian form of governance are most likely to be prone to such a rise of populist nationalism.

“In societies where people assume that they are expected to vote in certain ways, where they are not habituated to political choice and may be wary of taking it for granted, voting along national line became the most obvious option. Nationalism represents both a continuity with the past and a way of denying or ‘forgetting’ a complicity with the past.” (Kaldor 2001, p.80)

Strategic Analysis

The end of the Cold War period was obviously a political turning point for many nations that were part of a bloc alliance like the NATO or the Warsaw Pact or were just situated in the geopolitical borderline between East and West around the globe. A shift away from former alliances and treaties often meant a cut in financial support and the rise of an informal economy in which members of the population try to counterbalance the insecurity of the new political climate. In regions that played a role in the ‘proxy wars’ (Rogers 2002, p.35) of the Cold War era, there has mostly been a certain amount of unrest towards the foreign occupiers as well as attempts to infiltrate the local governments and its institutions by counterintelligence or even through financial support for paramilitary groups by the

superpowers. By the time such strategies became increasingly unnecessary, those countries often saw themselves abandoned from international political and financial support. Paramilitary groups in those countries that once were considered allies by the Eastern or Western alliances suddenly saw themselves being cut off from funding and therefore relied more on illegal or clandestine activities to maintain their organizations. Those developments can be observed throughout the history of organized armed struggle against established structures of power and is also true for the history of the relation between Al-Qaeda and the US.

The Cold War era can be perceived as the largest build-up of weapon arsenals, troops and the development of new weapon technologies in recent history. The climax of the arms race between the Soviet Union and the US was reached in the 1980s, with as many as almost 70.000 nuclear warheads altogether on both sides. (Rogers 2002, p.15)

According to Clausewitz, there are basically two theories of warfare, the theory of attrition and the theory of manoeuvring. (Kaldor 2001, p.22) Attrition theory aims at wearing down the resources of the enemy as well as to attain a higher number of casualties among enemy troops. Typical examples for a warfare based on attrition may be a defensive military operation or a counterstrategy for opposing a siege. Manoeuvring theory seeks to use the element of surprise against the enemy and is also concerned with pre-emptive strategies to win the conflict. If this set of ideas is applied to the Cold War strategies that were used, it becomes obvious that both sides relied on a mixture of those two theories. Nuclear weapons that serve as a deterrent to counter further strategic engagements by the enemy and the overall bloc distribution of the parties can be identified as a means of attrition. On the other hand, it was typical for that era that the source of conflict and their resolution moved into

affiliated countries of either side throughout the world. In fact, the US and the Soviet Union never engaged in an open conflict on their own territory, which also contributes to the assumption of a manoeuvring strategy.

What Kaldor finds most characteristic about Clausewitz theory on war is “the importance of overwhelming force and the readiness to use force” (2001, p.22) Applied to the overall strategies of the Cold War, there is again a corresponding tendency. It was common sense among military planners of that time to be alert and ready to deploy weapons anytime, as well as strategies that were concerned with a pre-emptive usage of nuclear weapons on both sides.

“By the 1980s there were around 20.000 tactical nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union, based in more than 15 countries and on warships and submarines throughout the world. In the great majority of cases, the presumption was that if such weapons were used, they would not necessarily involve an escalation into an all-out nuclear war. In other words, nuclear war fighting could be controlled. In Europe, perhaps the most tense region of the Cold War nuclear confrontation, both alliances had policies of the first use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional attack” (Rogers 2002, p.22)

The strategies that were used in fighting the Cold War led to various crises throughout the whole period. Beginning with the Korean War in 1950–1953, where the first consideration of the usage of nuclear weapons was formulated by the US forces, to one of the most prominent crises in Cuba in 1962, where a standoff between Soviet and US interests took place that was on the brink to an open escalation. Although there have been almost none direct casualties on either Soviet or US sides during their encounter in trouble spot all over the world, the number of indirect casualties suffered during ‘proxy wars’ was as high as 10 million total (Rogers 2002, p.35).

By the end of the Cold War, there has been a paradigm shift in terms of strategy by the dominant military forces. US military planners see themselves now confronted with not only

one large enemy, but with a diversity of enemy activities in many areas of the world. Due to the cultural and political changes described above, there has been an increase in paramilitary and sub-state groupings that pursue a variety of political goals, but mostly are concerned with particularistic interests and the opposition of hegemonic forces. Their set of strategies differs from the strategic approach of a maximum of force that was still prevalent in the Cold War years and was addressed towards geo-political achievements.

“The new wars are ‘globalized’ wars. They involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state. Participation is low relative to the population both because of lack of pay and because of lack of legitimacy on the part of the warring parties. There is very little domestic production, so the war effort is heavily dependent on predation and external support. Battles are rare, most violence is directed against civilians, and cooperation between warring parties is common.” (Kaldor 2001, p.90)

The common response of powerful nations as the US to this new kind of threat is to expand their range of military forces and to continue with a strategy of overwhelming force and readiness at all times, instead of dealing with the structural basis that serve as motivations for the sub-state or counter-state aggressors to go into armed struggle. Critics of that policy such as Rogers (2002, p. 102) argue that this policy is still part of an old security paradigm of maintaining the status quo and not addressing the underlying reasons for disruptions that lead to those conflicts.

Creating sub-state ideology

Having discussed the organizational structure from above, it seems necessary to take into account how the ideological basis for a particularistic group is formed and how the outer circumstances might trigger the decision for an armed struggle and so-called ‘terrorist’ operations. Shortly before the increase of terrorist attacks in the Middle East in the 1980s,

there have been various attempts towards armed resistance by individual groups by the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s in the industrialised West, one of them being the Red Brigades in Italy from 1970 to 1982. One problem in the definition of the 'war against terror' in the 21st century is to avoid a generalization of terrorist groups that have fundamentalist religious ideologies and the culture they are situated in. In order to show how terrorism works on an organizational level, the example of the Red Brigades may prove worthy because their cultural background is congruent to those parties that nowadays call for the 'war on terror', namely Christian and western-industrialized.

The Red Brigades started out as a protest organization that was affiliated with the student movements of the late 1960s in Italy. As soon as the claim was made that there cannot be political power without a form of military power and that this can be achieved through partisan action (Caselli and Della Porta, 1991 p.72), a splinter cell movement apart from the student organisations formed which later became known as the Red Brigades. This motivation can only be understood if it is taken into account that the resistance against the state is perceived as a resistance against an 'absolute enemy' (Manconi 1991, p.115). Hence, it still seems necessary to have an image of an enemy in order to legitimize organized violence. The operations of the Red Brigades were directed against oppressive tendencies towards the working class in the large factories of the Italian North. In contrast to other radical movements at that time, they tried to focus their actions in the industrialized areas in order to mobilize a proletarian struggle. Before their most notorious operations against individual factory managers and trade union bosses took place, a strategic shift from semi-clandestinity to complete clandestinity (Caselli and Della Porta 1991, p.72) took place,

justified by the group as a necessary condition for the maintenance of a military offensive strategy against the authoritarian means of control by the state.

Another distinct feature in the organization of the group were attempts to establish a form of 'counterpower' or 'counterjustice' towards established structures (Manconi 1991, p.128) by exposing kidnapped individuals to trials in which they accused them of crimes towards the proletariat by imposing oppressive methods of control upon them or the taking of sides towards fascist ideologies. The Red Brigades tried to keep those interrogations and trials as balanced as possible within their particularistic world-view. By choosing that option, they tried to resemble the structure of a state-like judiciary system that enabled them to legitimize their form of counterjustice. In some incidents the accused were pardoned after a hearing and the outcome of such procedures were published in memorandums (Manconi 1991, p.128)

"If what we have said up to this point is true, this is neither an imitation of the police nor merely the language of the propaganda. It is instead the expression of an ideological position and even of a philosophical stance. This is true to the point that even the most 'scandalous', 'illegal' or 'immoral' action – even by standards of the left – is never justified on purely instrumental grounds, but is always defended as 'legitimate'." (Manconi 1991, p.129)

The problem with this kind of legitimacy is the form by which it is claimed. The court or a trial as a means to obtain legitimacy is already a form of bureaucratization and institutionalization. Thus, it seems paradox to attempt to establish a form of counter-justice by means that are already established in the form of justice of the state. Foucault (1980, p.11) identifies three aspects of the court which is a third authority that mediates between the disputing parties, the reference to a consensus in terms of a universal rule of justice and the making of decisions with the power of enforcement. Foucault perceives penal law and therefore the form of the court as a tactical weapon created by the bourgeoisie to introduce

divisions within the population and therefore to consolidate the differences between the proletariat and the non-proletarian groups as well as the means of controlling this division by the bourgeoisie which is in fact a conduct of power. Due to that circumstance, he has objections in approving the concept of a people's court.

“There are two forms which must not under any circumstances be adopted by this revolutionary apparatus: bureaucracy and judicial apparatus. Just as there must be no bureaucracy in it, there must be no court in it. The court is the bureaucracy of the law. If you bureaucratise popular justice then you give it the form of a court.” (Foucault, p.27)

Another effect of the legitimisation process of the actions taken out by particularistic or terrorist groups is the process of depersonalization on behalf of the aggressor as well as the victim. (Cantazaro 1991, p.191) In order to be ready and determined enough to carry out acts of violence against individuals that can be regarded as a legitimate political act, a process of de-subjectification has to take place. This procedure gets problematic when it is incorporated into the whole social structure of militants, reaching from earlier to further generations. Especially when the amount of repression from the authorities of the state towards the terrorist groups increases, along with an increase of clandestinity and a kind of ideological competition with other groups, “a mechanism of self-generating violence is applied” to the whole situation “that took on aspects of economic instrumentalism for group survival ,or tended to loose its immediate political meaning or perspective” (Cantazaro, p.192).

Conclusion

It is not only on a sub-state level that military or paramilitary organizations lose parts of their legitimacy, this trend can also be perceived among nation-state armies.

“The national monopoly on legitimate organized violence has been eroded from above by the transnationalization of military forces. It has been eroded from below by the privatization of organised violence which is characteristic for the new wars.” (Kaldor 2001, p.140)

The governance of the US military is affected by the same process of economic instrumentalism that has been outlined by Cantazaro in respect of the development of the Red Brigades. On an internal level, there has been a significant reduction of troops and administrative personnel during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War era. The overall strength of the US Air Force dropped from 579.000 to 361.000 (Rogers 2002, p. 62) whereas the Department of Defence reduced its acquisition workforce about 50 percent, but at the same time, the number of procurement actions increased about 12 percent (Guttman 2004). Furthermore, there has been a significant increase in contractors working for the US military and officials within the military are concerned about this development.

"Private contractors may be acquired by foreign interests, acquire and maintain interests in foreign countries, and provide support to foreign customers. The contract administration oversight exerted over contractors is very different from the command and control exerted over military and civilian employees. Therefore, reliance on private contractors poses risks to maintaining adequate civilian oversight over intelligence operations. (...) In addition, once a function is contracted there is no assurance that the capability provided by the contractor will be maintained beyond the term of the contract" (Department of the Army, 2000)

On an external level, a folding between economic and geopolitical interests can be observed. Due to the increase consumption of non-renewable resources by the industrialised nations, the importance of external supplies to match that requirement rises. Until the beginning of the 1970s, the US could meet their own demands on oil, whereas nowadays they are heavily dependent on outside resources which can be located in the Persian Gulf region (Rogers 2002, p. 91). The oil resources of that area constitute about two thirds of the world's oil reserves and therefore, an increase of business and political interest plays a key role in the developments of that region. Furthermore, it is not only the location of the resources that

are of importance but also the infrastructure that provides it, which are pipelines in this case.

During the Cold War era, there have been repeated attempts by US intelligence to restructure political climates in favour of the US policy all over the world, most of them in Latin America and in the Middle East. In the case of Afghanistan, the US supported the paramilitary Mujahideen group after the takeover of government by the Afghan Communist party in 1979 to trigger an intervention by the Soviets which finally took place in December 1979 by an invasion of Soviet forces into Afghanistan (Wikipedia 2004). Supported by Saudi-Arabia, Pakistan and the US, the conflict between Mujahideen and Soviet forces lasted for 10 years until the withdrawal of Soviet military in 1989. The Al-Qaeda is more or less an offshoot of the former Mujahideen movement which were initially designed to carry out paramilitary operations with Islamic-fundamentalist ideology across the borders of Afghanistan after the end of the Cold War which is also the beginning of resentment towards the US due to abandoned political and financial support. The political disagreement with Saudi Arabia developed during the Gulf War in 1991, when the country allowed US troops on their soil to carry out military operations in Iraq. In terms of the organizational structure of terrorism, the Mujahideen and also Al-Qaeda is caught up in the typical dilemma of reproducing violence due to attempts to produce ideological legitimacy.

The US tried to counterbalance this development by a policy of 'liddism' (Rogers 2002, p. 102), meaning to maintain the status quo as long as possible. After the attacks on the World Trade Center, the policy changed by a reinforced reference to a 'war on terror' and military interventions were carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq with and without support of the United Nations. Although the term 'war on terrorism' was first used by the mass media of

the late 1940s to refer to a counterstrategy of the British government towards attacks of paramilitary Zionist groups, it was used again by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 in a speech to the UN General Assembly (Wikipedia 2004). In the most recent history the term is associated with the efforts of the Bush Administration towards the destruction of Al-Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalist and paramilitary groups. While state apparatuses and their institutions are regarded as the 'absolute enemies' by sub-state resistance, there is a similar pattern trying to condemn the actions of those organizations on the level of the state, but the true motivation of that relation goes further than just creating images of an enemy.

"The ultimate horizon of *Apocalypse Now* is this insight of how Power generates its own excess, which it has to annihilate in an operation that has to imitate what it fights. We thereby enter the domain of secret operations, of what the Power does without ever admitting it. And does not the same go for today's figures presented by the official media as the embodiments of radical Evil? (...) Is not the USA fighting its own excess in all these cases?" (Žižek 2002, p. 27)

By externalising the factors for an escalation of excesses of power and constituting an image of the 'Other' in the terms of psychoanalysis, the quest for legitimacy is replaced by a polemic of hypocrisy which not only allows excesses of 'subjectively just action' (Žižek 2002, p. 68) as in totalitarian regimes, it also loses the legitimacy and therefore the substantial means of state control of organized violence.

Thus, the 'war on terror' cannot be described in terms of a clash of civilizations, because this implies a paradigm of warfare that is no longer applicable to the paradigm of the new conflicts that took and take place in the post-Cold War period. The relation between those two can be outlined by the comparison of Chess and Go by Deleuze and Guattari.

"Chess is indeed a war, but an institutionalized, regulated, coded war with a front, a rear, battles. But what is proper to Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is a semiology. Finally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the

minimum number of peaces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The “smooth” space of Go as against the “striated” space of chess.” (1987, p. 353)

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